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Australia has commenced a project to build a new class of submarine, due to begin entering 
service in 2025.  They are to have greater capability than the Collins class that preceded them, 
with a strategic potential as launch platforms for land attack cruise missiles and improved 
tactical flexibility in networked joint operations.  Management of this project can be assisted by 
studying the Collins submarine project, particularly the successes obtained through the Navy’s 
development and maintenance of a robust concept of objectives for the Collins and the 
Commonwealth’s ability to command access to the means to rectify problems when the project 
was in difficulties.  From this perspective, the paper argues that a concept of operations with 
greater clarity around issues of joint operations needs to be formulated to guide development of 
the new submarines and that active use of contingency funding can be an effective tool in risk 
management during their design and construction. 
Australia has embarked on an endeavour to build twelve submarines of a 
new design to replace the existing Collins class boats from about 2025, 
under the designation Project Sea 1000.1  Submarines have been an 
important component of Australia's maritime defence since the 1960s when 
force of circumstance led to the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) acquiring six 
British Oberon submarines after a chequered history in the operation of 
submarines stretching back to 1914.  The construction of the Collins 
submarines marked the first time that Australia had made the transition from 
one class to another and the new submarine will signal a further increase in 
the importance of this type of warship in Australia's defence.  The new class 
will have the potential to undertake an important strategic role, with land 
attack cruise missiles added to their armament.  With advances in 
information technology and communications systems in particular, they 
should also possess a considerably improved capability for conventional 
naval engagements while expanding the fleet’s capacity to gather 
intelligence, including around ports of strategic interest. 
The task of delivering this capability will be daunting.  Submarine design and 
construction is a challenge but one that Australia has met successfully with 
the delivery of the Collins class.  This project had its problems but they 
                                                 
1
 This paper commences with the government’s approval of the project for a new submarine.  
For a thorough analysis of the factors that would have influenced this decision, see Ross 
Babbage, Australia’s Future Underwater Operations and Systems Requirements, Kokoda Paper 
no. 4 (Canberra: Kokoda Foundation, April 2007). 
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largely have been overcome.  This paper will study the successes and 
problems in the delivery of the Collins class to identify concepts that should 
provide useful insights in the development of the new submarines, looking 
both at factors that contribute to the development of a successful design and 
the requirements for managing the acquisition of the developed product 
through the production phase. 
Collins Establishes the Foundations  
The Collins class submarine project was a very complex and detailed 
undertaking spanning some thirty years in a period during which Australia 
changed fundamentally.  The project reflected, indeed sometimes 
anticipated, the changes that replaced an eighty-year heritage of protected, 
inward looking and often outdated Australian industrial sectors with 
enterprises having an export oriented and technologically based outlook.  
The project encouraged many enterprises to seek accreditation to formalised 
quality standards,2 was an early explorer of the potential of information 
systems and a successful pioneer of modular construction, the effect of 
which was to open participation to a wide range of Australian companies. 
Formally completed in 2004,3 the Collins project delivered a 
comprehensively updated submarine warfare capability to the RAN, despite 
problems and some continuing shortcomings.  This capability required more 
than delivery of the six largest conventional submarines of the modern era.  
It consolidated the deployability of the submarine force by leaving its builder, 
ASC Pty Ltd (originally the Australian Submarine Corporation—ASC) as the 
Collins design authority and with capacity for development, building, periodic 
refit and overhaul.  These are supplemented in Western Australia by the 
operational support of the Collins Systems Program Office at HMAS Stirling 
together with commercial maintenance facilities at Henderson, across 
Cockburn Sound from the naval base. 
With the Collins project, Australia developed its own procedures to warrant 
and manage the operational safety of its submarines; the indigenous 
Subsafe licensing regime was one of the significant achievements to emerge 
from the project.  Extensive Research, Development and Engineering 
(RD&E) capabilities (metallurgy, diesel technology and undersea acoustic 
research in Melbourne; systems research, design, integration and proof 
testing at Edinburgh), created or enhanced to support the development of 
the Collins class, remain as significant supports of their operational 
                                                 
2 When the Collins program began there were only thirty-five Australian companies certified to 
Defence quality standards.  As the project neared its conclusion in 1998 there were 1500.  Peter 
Yule and Derek Woolner, The Collins Class Submarine Story: Steel, Spies and Spin 
(Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 48. 
3 This was achieved with the Royal Australian Navy’s (RAN) acceptance of all six submarines 
for operational service.  The last of the Collins class, HMAS Rankin, was delivered a year 
earlier. 
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effectiveness.  As well, the unique channels of access to United States Navy 
(USN) subsurface warfare technology, won during the project’s most 
challenging days, remain as an ongoing support to RAN submarine 
operations through the joint agreement for cooperation on submarine 
matters signed on 10 September 2001. 
The submarines suffered from some well-publicised technical problems.  The 
most prominent was a combat system that did not perform as specified and 
was initially so unstable that no acceptance trial schedule could be 
maintained.  Other problems included unacceptable noise levels, unreliable 
diesels, optically unpredictable and sometimes dangerous periscopes, leaky 
valves and seals, and completely inadequate communications.  These 
deficiencies were overcome through the combined effort of the project team, 
the Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO), USN expertise 
and by contractor redesign.  The deployment of a replacement combat 
system, based on the core of the US Navy's AN/BYG-1(V)8 nuclear attack 
submarine system but retaining many of the features developed to achieve 
an acceptable degree of functionality from Rockwell’s original system, will 
not be completed until 2013.4 
The original project, Sea 1114 cost around $5 billion, which, allowing for 
inflation, was actually slightly less than the 1987 contracted price of $3.9 
billion.5  Overcoming the performance defects needed additional finance, 
funded under Sea 1429 and Sea 1439, with an additional $1.2 billion 
allocated in total.  Some $140 million was spent to rectify the faults identified 
during the Collins acceptance trials and almost $500 million was earmarked 
for the Replacement Combat System (RCS).  The rest funded capability 
upgrades, such as replacing the communications system that had become 
woefully outdated since its original specification.  The delivery of all boats 
was delayed for a variety of reasons but the six boats were delivered on 
average within 26 months of contracted dates.  Of complex projects only the 
ANZAC class frigate, which followed the Collins and benefited from the 
experience, displays a better performance.  Even projects that have been 
considered models of successful project management, such as the Huon 
class mine hunters, experienced longer delays.6 
It is, therefore, difficult not to acknowledge the success of the Collins project 
in building from scratch something never achieved before in Australia, and 
which required complex processes and advanced technology that few other 
                                                 
4 The replacement system had an in service date of 2006 (but did not go to sea until 2008).  
Defence Materiel Organisation, ‘Collins Replacement Combat System’, updated August 2008, 
<http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/lsp/collins.cfm> [Accessed 30 April 2009]. 
5 Yule and Woolner, The Collins Class Submarine Story, p. 325, footnote 8. 
6 Mark Thompson, The Cost of Defence.  ASPI Defence Budget Brief 2006–07 (Canberra: 
Australian Strategic Policy Institute, May 2006), p. 112, Figure 4.11 ‘The Long Wait’, 
<http://www.aspi.org.au/publications/publication_details.aspx?ContentID=93&pubtype=-1> 
[Accessed 1 February 2009]. 
Derek Woolner 
- 50 - Security Challenges  
nations had mastered.  Yet, despite these difficulties, the class was brought 
on stream in better time than most other benchmark projects. 
Some Ideas on Success 
THE BEGINNING TELLS THE TALE: A CONCEPT DRIVEN PROJECT 
The Collins project has established a viable basis for the development of 
Project Sea 1000, which is to build the next class of RAN submarine.  
Consequently, the most important lessons for the new project must be about 
how the successes of the Collins project were achieved. 
The fundamental insight into the management of that project relates to how 
its most important objectives were conceived at the beginning.  Foremost, 
the RAN developed a set of performance parameters derived from a strong 
operational concept.  The implications of this concept were vigorously 
contested7 and, indeed, were only finally settled by Cabinet decision in 1985 
when selecting the preferred tenderers for the funded project definition study 
phase of the Collins class acquisition. 
The disputes have been presented many ways, as between the choice of 
larger or smaller submarine designs, military or civilian camps within the 
defence organisation or a regional strategic focus versus forward deployed 
operations.  In reality, what they represented was the poor integration of the 
Defence organisation at that time, especially for the task of translating 
endorsed policy into force structure options.8  The development of the 
Collins project began, after all, only a few years after the Tange reforms had 
produced a single Department of Defence.  The disputes were a waste of 
time, money and creative energies but they did force the Navy to 
consistently refine its objectives for the new submarine and produce a 
concept that was able to support the development of the Collins class from 
the early 1980s onwards. 
The operational concept for the next generation submarine was broadly 
traditional and, based on Second World War experience that forward 
deployment in the enemy's focal areas had seen the most effective use of 
submarines, emphasised long range and endurance.  There was, however, a 
                                                 
7 In one instance, a Force Structure Committee meeting in August 1981 adjourned while still 
disputing the size of submarine to be the basis of the program.  Considerable work went into 
papers re-examining the issues until in December 1981, John Moten, in charge of Force 
Development and Analysis, agreed that the Navy had made its case for large-sized submarines.  
He then assisted the committee process by completing the Minutes of the August meeting with 
some “constructed” dialogue showing an agreement forming that the Navy’s proposal for large 
sized submarines was preferred. John Moten, First Assistant Secretary, Force Development 
and Analysis (FASFDA), ‘Navy 1114—NCSM’, Minute, 23 December 1981. 
8 This is a problem of no small longevity.  Improved arrangements for performing this transition 
are introduced in the recent Defence White Paper. Department of Defence, Defending Australia 
in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030, Defence White Paper 2009, (Canberra: Department of 
Defence, April 2009), p. 69. 
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contemporary twist in that the Navy had achieved considerable success in 
gathering intelligence with the Oberons off—and sometimes in—the 
approaches to the ports of Cold War opponents.  Consequently, the Navy’s 
performance parameters were not just relevant to the unlikely circumstances 
of unlimited warfare, but represented an ongoing capability that contributed 
to deterrence in peace-time whilst retaining a latent wartime potential.  
Analysis of factors such as transit times to operational areas, required time 
on station and optimum crew endurance indicated the required mission 
range and duration.  These factors in turn, indicated the stores, including 
weapons, that needed to be carried. 
Improvements in submerged endurance and indiscretion rate (that is the 
ratio of the time that the submarine needed to be near the surface and 
operating diesel engines to recharge its batteries, compared to the time it is 
fully submerged) increased the time that could be spent around operational 
areas and improved the value of the mission's yield.  The Oberon class 
suffered from a limitation of its generator set; it could not both proceed at 
speed and provide the maximum charge rate for its batteries.  To improve 
performance, a large generator set was specified for the new submarine.  
These factors indicated the need for a large submarine, a design indeed 
larger than any conventional submarine then available.  This outcome was 
further supported by the requirement for a large hull to mount the latest 
generation of sonar arrays.  These, and particularly the towed array sonar, 
provided long-range targeting data that allowed the performance of the sub-
launched Harpoon anti-shipping missile to be fully exploited.  Analysis of its 
operational environment and technical requirements therefore provided a 
firmer outline of the new submarine. 
These objectives would not have to be forged in a vacuum; they aimed to 
exploit developing opportunities.  Submarine technology had advanced 
considerably since the design of the Oberon, itself the final extrapolation of 
the Type 21 U-boat, the ultimate in German Second World War submarine 
technology.  Since the Oberon had been designed diesel engine power-to-
weight ratio had improved by about 250 percent, with reduced fuel 
consumption.  Battery energy density was almost 30 percent greater.  This 
improvement in energy efficiency could now be applied to a less demanding 
task as the modified teardrop shape of modern submarine design reduced 
submerged water resistance by about 70 percent.9 
Furthermore, the growing application of information technology for then 
novel purposes also seemed likely to influence the physical nature of the 
future submarine.  The Swedish Navy had built submarines with an 
automated control system replacing a multitude of valve wheels and pipes.  
                                                 
9 The preceding discussion reflects many of the points made in, Captain Graham White, 
‘Justification of Capability for the new construction submarine’, Minute, 18 January 1985, cited 
in Yule and Woolner, The Collins Class Submarine Story, p. 31. 
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The conceptual combat system seemed likely to do the work of many crew 
members.  Together, such applications promised to reduce crew numbers 
from the sixty-three of the Oberon to something around fifty.  This was not 
just advantageous for recruitment and retention in the submarine arm—of 
concern even in the early 1980s—but would reduce the hotel load (that is, 
the amount of space, stores and power required to support the crew) of the 
new submarine, thus providing an even greater improvement in 
performance. 
GETTING IT WRONG 
Unfortunately, success does not attend the early formulation of objectives 
simply because they are clear sighted.  The Collins combat system owed as 
much to experience as the requirements for the Collins platform.  As the 
Collins objectives formed, the RAN was implementing the Submarine 
Weapons Update Program (SWUP) to modernise the combat systems of the 
Oberons, which had an almost Second World War vintage manual command 
arrangement.  The SWUP introduced a computerised system and the latest 
generation of submarine sonars.  Integrating the acoustic data was complex 
and it took some changes of equipment and much RD&E effort but, when 
perfected, the RAN Oberons became the first conventional submarine 
capable of operating the USN's nuclear attack submarine weaponry of Mark 
48 torpedoes and Harpoon sub-surface launched anti-shipping missiles.  
The SWUP also consolidated the capacity of the Submarine Warfare 
Systems Centre (SWSC), both to sustain advanced electronics and to 
research further developments. 
The Navy was convinced that the SWUP, sustained by the expertise of the 
SWSC, gave it the most advanced combat system in a conventional 
submarine.10  In an era where systems mostly came with the platform in a 
package dictated by the shipbuilder, it feared that this superiority could not 
be sustained by any combat system likely to be incorporated in an existing 
design.  Opinion within the SWSC was that the combat system for the new 
submarine would have to be developed as a distinctly separate component 
within the acquisition program, a radical approach that led to the combat 
system supplier being issued a contract separate from that to supply the 
submarine. 
A functional specification for the new system was written with the expertise 
of the SWSC that envisioned a substantial performance increase over the 
SWUP standard.  The upgraded Oberons could track two targets 
simultaneously;11 the functional specification called for much more and 
                                                 
10 This conclusion was reinforced when the evaluation team assessed the combat systems of 
the British Type 2400 and Dutch Walrus submarines then being introduced to their home 
Navies.  Both were adjudged to be less capable than the SWUP system.  Yule and Woolner, 
The Collins Class Submarine Story, p. 70. 
11 Paul Dibb and Commodore Terry Roach, 'Collins: The Submarine We Had To Have', 
Financial Review, 17 February 1999. 
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wanted tracking to be performed automatically.  Further, display consoles 
were to be multi-tasked, each capable of performing any task and accepting 
all data sources.  Richard Brabin-Smith, participating in the selection process 
from the civilian side, thought there was greater risk with the combat system 
designs than with those for the platforms and questioned the sense in the 
specifications being so demanding.  “100 auto tracks! Whom are we 
fighting”, he asked and, whilst acknowledging that the designs offered were 
state of the art, wondered “what is the priority of this for Australia’s strategic 
circumstances?”12 
The RAN was aware both that some aspects of the specification pressed 
against the boundaries of technology and that no one had built anything like 
it.  Nonetheless, personnel at the SWSC were convinced that they had 
identified the direction of systems development and that their specifications 
outlined the combat system that would be needed in the 1990s.  The RAN 
was not alone in this conviction, the USN pursuing a contemporaneous and 
equally fruitless path with the combat system for its Seawolf class nuclear 
attack submarines (SSN).13  In fact, there was little information on which to 
proceed.  There was no accepted working definition of distributed 
processing, the architecture that was to be specified for the new combat 
system and Ada, the required computer language, existed only as American 
development specifications.  Both of these features proved to be significant 
weaknesses of the Rockwell system developed for the Collins class. 
Despite these warnings, the evaluation of systems offered to the project 
became a classic case of familiarity reducing the threshold of risk perception.  
The success of the SWUP appears to have led to over-confidence in both 
the SWSC’s ability to generate feasible objectives and the Navy’s ability to 
assess the compliance of responding tenders.  The Tender Evaluation 
Board’s assessment of the competitors was logically structured and 
objective, yet familiarity with the consortium led by Rockwell14 caused the 
Board to abandon its dry and technical impartiality and adopt an enthusiasm 
seldom seen in formal government reports.  The Board’s report softened the 
awareness of other participants (such as the Augmented Defence Source 
Selection Committee to which it reported) about the dangers inherent in the 
approach the project was about to take 
Rockwell has designed a new system … [That] is a logical follow-up-system 
to the … SWUP combat system.  In view of the technical and management 
strengths of the consortium members, the technical risk for the design and 
                                                 
12 Richard Brabin-Smith, FASFDA to Chair of the A/DSDC (Augmented Defence Source 
Selection Committee), Minute, 20 January 1987.  Brabin-Smith was later to become Chief 
Defence Scientist and Deputy Secretary, Strategic Policy.   
13 The USN spent US $1.5 billion on the BSY-1 system before it was cancelled. 
14 The other major US company in the consortium was Singer Librascope, a central participant 
in the SWUP project. Former SWSC personnel had also moved to join an Australian firm 
involved in the consortium. 
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development and production of the proposed system is assessed as low. 
[emphasis added]15  
The faith placed in both the technology and the capacity of international 
technology leaders to deliver it, proved unfounded.  The Collins combat 
system was to fail in architectural concept, technical capability and supplier’s 
corporate structure.16  Acceptable performance was not achieved until its 
architecture was changed, with data processing broken out from its original 
pathways and routed through new American and Australian applications 
introduced with DSTO assistance after the Navy sought help from the USN. 
There was surprisingly little questioning of the combat system concepts 
during the developmental stage of the Collins project.  Apprehension was 
focused on the physical task of the design, engineering and construction of 
the submarine platform and the ceaseless debate about this aspect of the 
project appears to have contributed to a stronger performance in this area.  
In contrast, the combat system was too little scrutinised, not just in the 
conceptual phase but also during its later development where, for significant 
periods, the project lacked qualified personnel to second into the supplier's 
organisation. 
Neither was the management of the combat systems delivery assisted by the 
contractual structure provided for that purpose.  The Rockwell consortium 
had a separate contract with the Commonwealth to supply its system but 
was identified as a subcontractor to ASC in the latter’s contract with 
Commonwealth.  Rockwell wanted to be a prime contractor and, according 
to many, behaved as if it were.17  When ASC grew concerned that the 
combat system was failing and in 1993 attempted to exercise its contractual 
status to declare Rockwell in default it was forbidden to do so by Defence.  
Not surprisingly, thereafter ASC left to the Commonwealth, now in a 
weakened contractual position, the responsibility of managing Rockwell’s 
system. 
In general, the Collins combat system had demonstrated many similarities 
with the acquisition programs for software intensive systems that were to 
follow.  Those features that came to be replicated were a desire to process 
centrally input data from too large a range of sensors and then attempt to 
simultaneously distribute and concurrently display so much data that it 
exceeded the system’s capacity to exchange information and, lastly, to 
remove human expertise from the loop at too early a stage.  These 
                                                 
15 New Construction Submarine Project, ‘Report of the Tender Evaluation Board on the 
Response Received to Request for Tender No. T 61/72521X’, 14 September 1984, p. 6-45 in 
Yule and Woolner, The Collins Class Submarine Story, p. 70. 
16 The effects that the dysfunctional corporate structure of the Rockwell consortium had upon 
the development of the combat system are discussed in Yule and Woolner, The Collins Class 
Submarine Story, p. 154ff. 
17 Ibid., p. 160. 
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characteristics were echoed in the objectives of the Kaman Super 
Seasprites’ Integrated Tactical Avionics System and the Recognised Air 
Picture supposed to be produced by Project Vigilare, the project to provide 
the ground-based component of the Australian air defence system. 
In contrast, the Collins Ship Control and Management System (SCMS) was 
developed with minimum drama and has performed as expected.  As it was 
central to the performance and safety of the class, there was appropriate 
concern that this system for the automated control and monitoring of the 
submarines should perform as intended.  A complex system, the SCMS 
used nineteen computers (with the same Motorola processors as the combat 
system) around the boat to monitor over 5000 data points—in fact, checking 
every piece of equipment on the boats as well as controlling their function.  It 
was an extrapolation of the system developed by Saab Instruments for 
Swedish submarines and escaped attempts to reconfigure it other than as an 
adaptation to the demands of the larger Australian design.  Although not 
without problems in development, which were mostly a result of poor 
management structure,18 the SCMS met its objectives and has performed 
reliably in service. 
The contrasting fortunes of Rockwell’s combat system and the SCMS 
highlight the inherent risk of undertaking systems development by predicting 
future performance benchmarks and developing, ab initio, the combination of 
sensor inputs, transmission links, data processing and logical assessment 
outputs to provide a uniquely new capability.  Rather than the attempt at a 
state-of-the-art system for the Collins class, an alternative might have been 
to migrate a variant of the SWUP system, evolved to process data from the 
new sensors, to the Collins.  In the light of similarly sobering experience in 
the acquisition of other military systems, a generally preferable option would 
appear to lie in developing plans to achieve the maximum performance of 
systems through evolutionary development and, where technology has 
advanced, staged upgrading of their constituent elements. 
Concept of Operations and Australia's Next Submarine 
Initial work on the RAN's next generation of submarines was approved in 
October 2008, with $4.67 million allocated for studies that will look at areas 
such as "battery technology and conceptual designs for weapons and 
payload handling and storage".19  The Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO) 
has begun a global search for design, propulsion, weapons and sensor 
                                                 
18 Ibid., p. 162-3. 
19 The Hon. Greg Combet MP, Parliamentary Secretary for Defence Procurement, The National 
Interest-Challenges of a Submarine Building Industry, Address to the Submarine Institute of 
Australia, 6 November 2008, p. 5. 
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systems and an "internationally recognized independent submarine design 
consultant" will be appointed to assist in early design activity up until 2011.20 
This activity should yield important information on the current state of 
conventional submarine technology and sharpen insight into the problems of 
applying it to a new design.  Yet that information will not of itself identify the 
characteristics needed in Australia’s next submarines, nor even indicate how 
these features should be determined.  If the foundation of the success of the 
Collins project was Navy's thinking about what it wanted from its next 
submarine, the most important question for the Collins' successor is: what 
concepts will underlie Sea 1000? 
The battle over the concept of operations for the Collins class appears to 
have established the physical baseline for Sea 1000—design criteria will be 
long range and endurance, extended submerged endurance and a high 
weapon load, indeed one larger and more versatile now that land attack 
cruise missiles have been added to the next submarines' inventory.  These 
characteristics are already enough to indicate that the next submarine will 
again be a large, conventionally powered boat and, as such, a unique 
Australian design. 
However, the nature of warfare has moved a considerable distance since the 
early 1980s and the crucial issues informing the concept of operations for 
the next submarine do not primarily concern the physical characteristics of 
the submarine platform, but rather its role in the interconnected battle space 
of joint operations.  This is most obviously a consideration when dealing with 
submarine operational areas within the range of other Australian Defence 
Force (ADF) force elements, but it even intrudes into the nature of their use 
in far distant regions. 
The ADF has for some years focused on increasing its military effectiveness 
by improving the capacity of all force elements to work together, either in 
solely Australian operations or in coalition with foreign military forces.  A 
central concept that underpins this objective is Network Centric Warfare 
(NCW), which aims to interconnect information, primarily from sensors, 
through command and control arrangements to the force elements required 
to achieve results in the area of operations.  This endeavour is important 
because it offers a major increase in combat effectiveness and, since it has 
the potential to provide a greater awareness of events in areas where the 
ADF is operating, because it also should allow consideration of a wider 
range of engagement options. 
Traditionally, conventional submarines have not been a central element in 
joint operations.  Their limited tactical flexibility has made them poor at 
                                                 
20 Ibid. 
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responding to the changing nature of engagements21 and their reliance on 
stealth for survival has meant that submarines seldom communicate with 
other units while on operations.22  The Collins class’ excellent submerged 
performance has somewhat reduced its handicap in tactical situations and 
modern digital communications can be operated to complicate the task of 
detection.  Nonetheless, conventional submarine performance has, 
heretofore, provided little incentive to develop operational procedures for 
their use in support of joint operations.  Therefore, the Defence White Paper 
released in May 2009 appears to envisage a major performance 
improvement for the next class of submarine, allocating to it roles—to 
“defend our approaches” and “protect ... other ADF assets”23—previously 
successfully performed only with the sustained speed and endurance offered 
by nuclear powered submarines. 
While further improvements in performance should be expected from the 
new design, it is highly unlikely that the next submarines class will be 
sustaining SSN speeds while remaining submerged indefinitely, so one must 
assume that the increased effectiveness needed to perform such role is 
seen as coming from the development of the NCW concept within the ADF. 
Together with satellites and high altitude unmanned aerial vehicles, 
conventional submarines can gather intelligence from close to an opponent's 
military bases and thereby provide command with a timely awareness of 
developments.  If necessary, this can translate into "targeting quality data"24 
for jointly operating units through the RAN's planned Knowledge Command 
and Control enabler that will underpin its Future Maritime Operating Concept 
2025 (FMOC).  The issue of secure two-way communication between 
submarine and other units when needed, preferably over considerable 
distance, then is central to the design and development of the next 
submarine class and the White Paper confirms that they will be equipped 
with “very secure real-time communications”.25  This is a minimum if the 
concept for deploying sub-surface launched cruise missiles is not to be 
limited and inflexible. 
However, a central question still needs answering: can a forward deployed 
conventional submarine provide the near real time data flow needed to add 
to the combat effectiveness of joint operations, since "increases in combat 
                                                 
21 Both the United States and Japan deployed submarines at the Battle of Midway but they 
could neither anticipate the movements of the fleets nor match the manoeuvre speed of the 
carrier groups and were, consequently, ineffective. 
22 In the Second World War, German U-boats during the Battle of the Atlantic used radio to 
assemble ‘wolf packs’ to attack merchant convoys at night. This procedure had to be 
abandoned once the Allies had deployed enough escorts and the comparatively simple 
technology of radio direction finding to begin destroying large numbers of German submarines. 
23 Department of Defence, Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030, p. 64. 
24 Royal Australian Navy, Plan Blue 2006, <http://www.navy.gov.au/Publication:Plan_Blue_ 
2006> [Accessed 4 May 2009], p. 5. 
25 Department of Defence, Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030, p. 70 
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power from being a networked force are derived from the quality and 
timeliness of shared information",26 without abandoning the stealth on which 
depends the safety of conventional submarines?  Stealth is also important in 
submarine operations because it evokes a disproportionate response from 
opposing forces, which can have a strategic effect should it be possible 
thereby to vitiate the opponent’s efforts.  In contrast, stealth also provides 
nations with “deniability” that their forces are involved in any untoward 
activity.  Deliberate communication may be an effective means of triggering 
disproportionate response but is altogether antithetical to deniability.  Of 
course, the greatest benefit of a submarine’s stealth is to allow it to attack 
the enemy in areas where no other platform could survive.  It is the 
relationship between this rather more direct use of a submarine’s capabilities 
and using it to expand the potency of a naval task group that needs further 
thought. 
There seems to be a general Defence expectation that "submarines will be 
increasingly incorporated into task groups as the technological 
advancements in NCW allow geographically distant assets to be centrally 
coordinated by the task group commander",27 and the White Paper sharpens 
this a little by nominating “gathering battlespace data in support of 
operations”28 as one of the roles of the new class.  Current thinking within 
Defence is that utilising submarines as data nodes will happen since "for the 
Navy, NCW will largely be an evolution of existing practices".29  This may be 
so for the RAN's surface and air assets but there is little sign in the FMOC of 
existing practice that can be “evolved” for submarines.30   
This divergence suggests that more thought needs to be given to a 
fundamental issue at the root of the concept of operations for the RAN's 
future submarines, well before designs are sketched out.  The issues 
involved can be addressed adequately by scientific research and evaluation, 
for which the ADF and DSTO are well equipped.  Nonetheless, the 
consideration will be complex as the outcomes will influence not only choices 
                                                 
26 Department of Defence, NCW Roadmap (Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, February 
2007), p. 5. 
27 Ibid., p. 55. 
28 Department of Defence, Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030, p. 70. 
29 Ibid., p. 34. 
30 The Future Maritime Operating Concept mentions networked submarine systems only in the 
context of fixed underwater sensors but, even in this limited context, notes "the under sea 
environment presents significant challenges for communications that must be overcome to 
enable networked, area denial systems". (That is, for anti-submarine warfare, not for submarine 
operations.).  Later, it states "Technologies are enabling higher data transmission rates across 
greater distances, the limitations of the water column being acknowledged." (emphasis added): 
Australian Defence Force, Future Maritime Operating Concept—2025: Maritime Force 
Projection and Control (Canberra: Defence Publishing Services, January 2007), p. 12, 13. 
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on information technology and communications requirements for the new 
submarines, but will extend to other systems and even to hull design.31  
Because the Australian operating environment is very different from that of 
other conventional submarines, the RAN’s concept of operations for the new 
class will not necessarily yield design solutions with wide international 
acceptance.  For instance, there is a general assumption that because they 
are in extensive use overseas, Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) systems will 
be a requirement for the Collins successors.  AIP systems are important for 
small European submarines operating in heavily patrolled waters on 
deployments lasting about a working week.  They may not necessarily be 
useful for Australian submarines deployed over thousands of nautical miles 
on seventy-day operations.  AIP systems are heavy and occupy hull volume 
(always at a premium in submarine design), or space under the casing, also 
at the expense of other functions, such as launch canisters for cruise 
missiles. 
Kockums designed an AIP installation for the Collins but it added ten metres 
(and additional cost) to a seventy-eight metre boat.  DSTO tested two forms 
of AIP system in the mid-1990s, but trials of HMAS Collins were to prove that 
its high generator capacity and large battery storage provided an unequalled 
performance and allowed the RAN to develop operational procedures for an 
energy cycle under patrol conditions that required "less than a very few 
minutes" in every twenty-four hours to adequately recharge the batteries.  
On balance, 
Sea trials of the first-of-class have proved that the Collins as it is now can 
stay submerged for such a long time, and have such a low rate of 
indiscretion, that a refit of an AIP system is not really needed and would 
simply not have any cost benefit.32 
Consequently, further research on AIP was dropped.  With the next class 
likely to be another large design, with volume for even more battery space 
made available by improvements in systems and with greater performance 
from advances in electrical generation and storage technology, one can 
expect an even better submerged endurance than achieved by the Collins 
                                                 
31 For example, it is generally expected that the use of ‘robotic’ Unmanned Underwater Vehicles 
(UUVs) will be a feature incorporated into the new submarines’ design and the concept is 
endorsed in the White Paper.  These UUVs have been seen as enabling real-time intelligence 
transmission from forward areas (as well as tasks such as mine laying).  However, UUV 
development is as yet so nascent as to require considerable thought on their physical 
construction, systems capabilities and operational procedures, let alone the requirements that 
they may impose upon the submarine design.  Therefore, a more considered assessment of the 
ability of submarine deployed UUVs to meet RAN requirements within a reasonable time scale 
might be less sanguine about their performance and could possibly argue that the new 
submarine project would benefit from their exclusion. 
32 Jons Janssen Lok, ‘Australia Rethinks AIP for Collins Class Boats’, Jane's Defence Weekly, 
17 July 1996, p.15, quoting Captain Paul Greenfield, RAN, then New Submarine Project 
representative at ASC. 
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class.  Whatever the design outcome, the point to note is that the availability 
of a technology does not by itself indicate that it will be the best option for 
achieving the RAN’s objectives.  These can only be understood in the 
context of the concept of operations for the new class of submarine and the 
evaluation of where effort and cost will best contribute to achieving the 
Navy’s aims. 
In such evaluation a central issue will be the nature of the combat system for 
the new submarine.  The current assumption, underwritten by the sobering 
experience of the Collins combat system, is that whatever appears in the 
new submarine will have evolved from the process of providing the Collins 
Replacement Combat System (RCS).  This is certainly the view of the Chief 
of Navy, Admiral Russ Crane: 
through our close association with the USN we have a very powerful and 
capable combat and weapons system that will evolve to meet future threats 
and embrace new technologies as they come along. … one of our options 
would be to spiral off this for the next generation of submarines.  I would go 
so far as to suggest that the future version of the US SSN combat system, 
weapons and I add possibly sensors to this equation, might form the pre 
integrated [military off the shelf] option we put to Government for what we all 
know is the highest risk element of projects such as this.33 
While this is an appropriate strategy, more is needed to ensure that the new 
submarines will have a combat system suited for 2025, especially if 
requirements dictate their more extensive participation in joint operations.  
Reserving space for additional operators in the design will allow for less 
dependence on complex systems where integration fails or appears highly 
risky.  A more vigorous development of the RCS over the rest of the Collins 
service life will be helpful.  The Collins RCS retains more of the old Rockwell 
design than is generally appreciated.  It was originally intended that it would 
combine the tactical and fire control elements of Raytheon’s USN SSN 
system, combined with an STN Atlas interface to process data from the 
existing sonars.  However, to reduce costs the sonar processing solutions 
from the combat system augmentation program of 2000 were retained.34 
Because of such weaknesses in the evolutionary growth path towards a 
combat system for the new submarines, upgrades for the Collins combat 
system, such as Sea 1439 Phase 6 for their sonar, assume an added 
importance.  Additional expenditure and RD&E on these programs will be 
justified where they assist development of a more mature system for the new 
                                                 
33 Vice Admiral Russ Crane, Chief of Navy, ‘Submarines in Australia’s Future Maritime 
Defence—Chief of Navy Perspective’, Chief of Navy Speech to the Submarine Institute of 
Australia Conference 2008, 6 November 2008, <http://www.defence.gov.au/media/ 
SpeechTpl.cfm?CurrentId=8420> [Accessed 30 April 2009]. 
34 As Bob Clark, one of the most experienced systems experts involved with the Collins class, 
commented: "we should have changed the name of the project at the time from Replacement 
Combat System to something less grand as we really only replaced tactical and fire control and 
augmented the sonar".  Yule and Woolner, The Collins Class Submarine Story, p. 308. 
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class of submarine.  The viability of this approach has been strengthened by 
the RAN and DSTO being established as the design approval authority for 
the RCS and by the considerable advances in DSTO's systems analysis 
capabilities, most recently added to by the creation of the Defence Systems 
Integration Technical Advisory.35  
Doing the Impossible: Building Submarines in Australia 
HOW THE IMPOSSIBLE WAS ACHIEVED 
A clear view of operational objectives was only one feature of the early 
planning that underpinned the outcome of the Collins project.  The planning 
differed significantly from processes of the day in considering all aspects of 
the acquisition strategy concurrently with development of the Required Ships 
Characteristics (RSC).  This was not so much an attempt to streamline the 
development of the project as it was a recognition of a fundamental element 
of military efficiency, that capability cannot be enduring unless it is 
sustainable. 
The project team under Captain Graham White did not formulate the issue 
as bluntly as this but the Navy fully realised that the efficiency of its 
submarine force was impaired by unsatisfactory support arrangements.  The 
RAN had experienced difficulty maintaining its O-boat fleet as time had 
passed.  Through-life-support was never easy with designs of the Oberon 
era and the periodic refits performed at Vickers’ Cockatoo Island Dockyard in 
Sydney Harbour were complex and expensive,36 with overseas suppliers 
providing 85 to 90 percent of support.37  With the Royal Navy preoccupied by 
nuclear boat operations it was increasingly difficult for the RAN to get British 
advice and support.  With the Falklands War, this all but ceased. 
The capability of the RAN’s submarine force was directly linked to its 
availability and the operational availability of the new submarine would be 
best enhanced with through-life-support provided by the local industry that 
an Australian build program would create.  This would represent an 
operational benefit outweighing the additional cost entailed.  Later, Paul Dibb 
was to note that the six Collins submarines would be the equivalent of nine 
                                                 
35 This is a joint DSTO and DMO group, established to evaluate and assist projects involving 
complex systems integration.  The Hon. Warren Snowdon MP, Minister for Defence Science 
and Personnel and the Hon. Greg Combet, Parliamentary Secretary for Defence Procurement, 
‘New initiative to improve systems integration’, Defence Media Release 008/2009, 22 January 
2009. 
36 The refit of HMAS Oxley, the first of an Oberon submarine in Australia, cost 76 percent of its 
purchase price.  Oberon submarine refits generally took two years to complete.  ‘$9.2 Million 
Submarine Costs $7 Million to Refit’, Sydney Morning Herald, 8 February 1973; Frank Cranston, 
’Submarine Refit Slow and Costly‘, Canberra Times, 9 February 1973. 
37 Kenneth Davidson, ’Navy Determined to Build Submarines in Australia‘, The Age, 17 January 
1985. 
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or ten Oberons, increasing the RAN’s potential operational presence to 
simultaneous patrols in three separate areas.38 
Although the early conceptual work of the RAN was critical to the success of 
the Collins project, the decision to build the boats locally determined the 
nature of the project more than anything else, for it fundamental changed the 
nature of its development.  Once it was agreed to build in Australia, all 
management concepts had to be changed to fit.  The project was no longer a 
traditional capability acquisition program but now had to balance the 
objectives of naval capability, industrial development, complex project 
management, parent navy responsibility and through-life logistics support 
and planning in equal part, all to suit uniquely Australian requirements and 
all developed afresh. 
The early work of the project team and supporting elements within the RAN, 
particularly under Bill Rourke as Chief of Navy Materiel, involved 
considerable effort within Australia and overseas to understand what would 
be involved in local construction.  This enabled the project team to clearly 
define the challenge and allowed them to identify the responses required 
when industry was approached.  Thus, responders to the first tenders were 
asked not just for offers of equipment but for concepts for and details of its 
construction in Australia.  Unsurprisingly, implementation was difficult and 
controversial, for not all of the tenderers understood how serious was the 
RAN’s insistence that local construction was an integral part of the project.39   
What made construction in Australia possible was the ability of the project 
team to conceptualise the task in a way completely different from the 
conventional.  When Graham White began his work, the general attitude 
outside the RAN was that submarines could not be built in Australia.40  This 
was in part because of the perceived complexity of submarine construction 
but also a result of the appalling record of traditional shipyards in Australia.  
These were characterised by poor productivity and an inability to maintain 
schedules, created by poor management conditions often resulting from 
irregular and intermittent workloads.  Consequently, labour relations were 
                                                 
38 This improved capability was due to a combination of factors, of which the improved support 
arrangements were one.  The designs of the German and Swedish contenders were developed 
to reduce maintenance requirements and submarine systems had, in general, become more 
reliable than those of the Oberon generation.  Paul Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence 
Capabilities (Canberra: AGPS, 1986), p. 123. 
39 Jim Duncan, the leader of South Australia's effort to become the site for the production of the 
Collins, commented in his diary in 1984, "VSEL (commonly known as ‘Vickers’ and who were 
the British contenders) are bitter that they are being beaten by a production technology … They 
claimed Canberra is obsessed with production technology rather than submarine technology."  
Yule and Woolner, The Collins Class Submarine Story, p. 56. 
40 The attitude that submarines could not be built in Australia was not confined to government 
and was accepted by some of the most powerful industrial figures.  Brian Loton, then Managing 
Director of BHP, responded to White that, "we can't do these things in Australia—give up on the 
idea".  Yule and Woolner, The Collins Class Submarine Story, p. 47. 
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appalling and capital investment inadequate.  Naval construction projects 
were based on designs from a variety of sources and the transfer of 
intellectual property and production planning had been patchy at best.  The 
early years of the Collins project coincided with an economic recession so 
severe that it changed Australia's manufacturing industry. 
Those involved with the Collins project, particularly with the state 
government efforts to gain production work, played a major role in changing 
Australia's industrial landscape.  This was necessary, because the project 
team had come to see that producing the Collins class was not shipbuilding 
but the project management of a complex assembly task.  On their 
inspections of world submarine construction the project team and state 
government task forces were able to see a tangible example of this 
approach in the modular construction technique demonstrated convincingly 
by the Kockums submarine construction facility at Malmo.41 
However, if modular construction was to be introduced to make feasible the 
building of submarines in Australia, the selection criteria would again have to 
be radically altered.  Modular construction allowed the project team to verify 
that Australian industry could build, or develop the capacity to build, the 
components and structures needed to complete a submarine, but it required 
tender respondents to present a management system that allowed the 
reliable and efficient assemble of those components into an effective 
submarine.  The formulation of this concept was assisted by the innovative 
approaches to production management, site arrangements and industrial 
relations that were becoming available.  By the early 1980s, information 
technology was spreading into industry, with the realisation that the 
consequences would be considerable.  As the Collins project developed, 
these influences spread from design to production management and on to 
the development of logistics, training and through-life-support planning.  The 
South Australian submarine task force for one did not miss the potential of 
computers to support design and manufacturing processes, and argued that 
Kockums construction techniques were five years ahead of their European 
counterparts, and two years ahead of American constructors such as 
Newport News.42 
Deciding that the RAN’s next submarine would be built with modular 
construction changed the project and made feasible what was previously 
considered impossible.  Hence the concept underlay much of the success of 
building the Collins class.  The project acquired naval vessels with 70 
percent Australian industry content at a time when Defence struggled to get 
                                                 
41 Ibid., pp. 50-1. 
42 South Australian Submarine Contract Task Force, RAN New Construction Submarine Project, 
South Australian Delegation Visit to Submarine Builders, Submission to the Department of 
Defence Support, 12 September 1984, p. 9ff.  Newport News, then building the later series of 
Nimitz class aircraft carriers, had adopted Kockums’ computer based management system and 
reported that they had reduced production costs by up to 25 percent. 
Derek Woolner 
- 64 - Security Challenges  
a 10 percent offset in major acquisition contracts with overseas prime 
suppliers.  It underlay the construction of ASC as a facility capable of turning 
out a submarine per year, better than most overseas submarine constructors 
and barely believable in an environment where extensive construction delays 
had been endemic.  The success of the concept provided the basis of 
support for Australia's submarine force for the life of the class and widened 
the base for RD&E, with small Australian companies supplying components 
as diverse as the DSTO developed anechoic tiles, and data management 
systems used in remediating the defective combat system. 
THE PROBLEMS THAT GO WITH THE VERY DIFFICULT 
As good as it was, the production aspects of the Collins program suffered 
from a number of problems, some of which were inherent in the approaches 
that made the project a success.  These highlight a number of cautions for 
the management of Sea 1000.  The Collins project's initial risk control 
strategy was to select a design that, at the least, was based on a submarine 
in service or in the process of entering service with the parent navy.  
However, the RAN, having decided on the design criteria discovered that, as 
we now know, no existing design could meet its requirements.  This being 
so, the assessment teams rigorously determined the probability, cost and 
other considerations in raising the deficient aspects of each design to the 
standard of the RSC.  The very logic of the processes for adjudicating the 
best combination of platform and systems performance, industrial program, 
price and schedule appears to have obscured the project's move away from 
its risk management strategy. 
It is now obvious that the project had clearly become a developmental 
vehicle for a unique class of submarine and that the acquisition strategy no 
longer reflected the nature of the project.  This development was 
compounded by a deteriorating economy where the government's fiscal 
priority was to reduce its spending.  The project insisted that, for the integrity 
of the RAN’s submarine capability, the performance of the Collins class 
should not be compromised and, consequently, project funding was thinly 
spread in other areas.  Significantly, given the history of the project, this 
action only left a designated contingency fund of 2.5 percent to rectify any 
faults that emerged.  Usually, a 15 percent contingency is allocated for 
complex engineering tasks and it is ironic, that the total of the funds 
subsequently allocated under new project designations to rectify Collins 
performance shortcomings and modernise equipment amounted to a margin 
of some 20 percent over the fixed contract price. 
The Collins problems were fixed in any case by the usual public finance 
procedure of raising new appropriations.  However, the lack of an adequate 
contingency with agreed process for disbursement to overcome deficiencies 
in the delivered product contributed to antagonistic relations between 
customer and supplier that threatened to jeopardise the project’s outcome.  
The rising dust from the resultant confrontation convinced politicians and 
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public alike that something must be wrong, and this attitude further damaged 
the project. 
The Collins project was notable for the use of a fixed price contract.  This 
was very much a product of the times as it was a model intended to avoid 
the problems of significant cost overruns that were a feature of preceding 
acquisition projects.  The contract model was later held to be too inflexible 
and responsible for many of the difficulties that emerged later in the project 
and slowed action to fix the problems.43  Nonetheless, it is probable that the 
disputes over fixing the Collins shortcomings had a more direct link to the 
money that could not be forthcoming because of the inadequate allocation 
for contingencies.  In fact, far more significant to the course of the project 
was the belief underlying the fixed price model that a contractor’s signature 
would see it taking responsibility for the risks and the obligations required to 
discharge the contract.  The assumption proved to be by no means 
guaranteed, as developments during the life of the project proved capable of 
defeating the intent of any legal obligation, regardless of earlier agreement 
between the participants. 
A dominant issue that frequently undid the intent of the contract was industry 
politics.  The term is used here not in the sense of intrusion by industrial 
entities into the public political process but of problems arising from the 
conflicting agendas of the participating companies.  This factor was difficult 
to avoid since the commercial bodies involved would always have their own 
interests to safeguard, regardless of their conjoint participation with others to 
meet the Commonwealth’s objectives. 
A casualty was to be the Collins combat system, where the politics of 
protecting commercial interests were to prove disastrous.  Rockwell and 
Singer Librascope may have been members of the successful consortium 
but their separate commercial goals placed them as competitors in the world 
outside the Australian project.  After the contract was awarded, Rockwell, 
wanting to avoid advantaging its competitor, asked the inexperienced junior 
consortium member Computer Sciences of Australia to write the combat 
system software.  Singer drew its own conclusions, delivered on its 
obligations early and effectively left the consortium—its expertise (an 
important factor leading to the consortium becoming preferred supplier) was 
not available when, later, the combat system failed to meet requirements.44   
As noted above, Defence exacerbated the industry politics that had 
compromised the combat system’s development when it refused to support 
ASC in its desire to default Rockwell for non-delivery on its sub-contract.  
The action supported Rockwell's desire to be directly responsible to the 
                                                 
43 Malcolm McIntosh and John Prescott, ‘Report to the Minister for Defence on the Collins Class 
Submarine and Related Matters’, Canberra, 20 June 1999, p. 22. 
44 Yule and Woolner, The Collins Class Submarine Story, p. 159. 
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Commonwealth and encouraged it to seek variations to its contractual 
obligations.  It also sent a message to ASC that, since Defence had failed to 
support it in enforcing the Commonwealth’s own contract, ASC should leave 
it to Defence to ensure that the combat system met the RAN’s requirements.  
Yet, in complete contrast, at an earlier date the project office had intervened 
in the industrial politics of the initial ASC consortium when it acted to remove 
Chicago Bridge and Iron (CBI) from the company.  CBI was a large 
American project engineering company with a profitable history of building 
turnkey projects for other companies to operate.  Its philosophies did not sit 
easily with those of Kockums and in the late 1980s the submarine project 
office had identified the friction between the two as threatening the planning 
and coordination of the early industrial development of the project.  By March 
1990 CBI had sold its 20 percent share in ASC.45  
There is a more definitive manifestation of industry politics, where market 
imperatives remove a contractor altogether, causing turbulence and delays 
and (often of significant consequence) the loss of the expertise and 
dedication of foundation commercial personnel.  Of the original ASC 
consortium, Wormald (then one of Australia’s leading technology 
developers) ceased to exist early in the life of the project when it was taken 
over by market speculators in a period of cheap finance, and dissolved soon 
after when economic conditions soured.  Thus, years before a boat had been 
launched, the nature of the consortium building them had totally changed.  
Similarly, Rockwell’s US parent left the military systems market in the 1990s, 
selling its interests to Boeing, who were thereby flick-passed the problems of 
the Collins combat system.  Kockums itself was acquired by its old 
competitor, HDW, triggering a government take-over of ASC, which whilst 
allowed under the contract, was nonetheless completely against the direction 
of general economic policy under the then Coalition government. 
Then again, even with the best of will, a company might find its technological 
capacity rendered insufficient by the changes that inevitably occur over the 
lifespan of most major acquisition projects.  There was an element of this in 
the dispute that occurred between Kockums and the Commonwealth over 
the need to improve the cavitation performance of the boats’ propellers.  
Even cooperating to the fullest, Kockums could not hope to compete with the 
output from the project’s access to the USN’s underwater technologies, or 
even to be in a position to assist the absorption of that highly classified 
information into the Collins design.  Notwithstanding, Kockums retained a 
responsibility to safeguard its shareholders’ interests and its continuing roles 
in the project and thus initiated protracted legal action, the most publicised 
part of which was to challenge the RAN’s dispatch of a Kockums designed 
propeller to the United States.  Ostensively about the competing rights of 
Kockums and the Commonwealth to the former’s intellectual property, the 
                                                 
45 Ibid., pp. 181-2. 
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event was a classic example of the consequences of growing misalignment 
between project requirements and an entity’s industrial political pressures. 
The lesson is that ultimately the Commonwealth cannot leave it to suppliers 
to solve problems in major defence acquisition projects.  The acquisition 
cycle of most major military systems is generally over ten years and is out of 
balance with the rapid growth expectations formed within commercial 
markets over the last few decades.  It is unlikely that all of the industrial 
participants initially contracted at the beginning of Sea 1000 will still exist 
when the last boat is delivered in the 2030s.  Neither can it be guaranteed 
that those that remain will possess at the end of the project the same 
comparative technical excellence that justified them being selected.  Yet it is 
at this point, when the product has reached a stage where its performance 
can be assessed, that leading technical expertise will be most needed. 
In truth, it is only the Commonwealth that has an abiding interest in the 
objective of a project over the whole period, namely that it continues to meet 
the needs of the ADF.  For commercial entities the economy and commercial 
factors are dominant.  One feature that stands throughout the Collins project, 
especially during the period where its problems were being overcome, is that 
the Commonwealth must command its own access to the means to rectify 
problems if it intends to have projects achieve their objectives. 
BUILDING SEA 1000 
The project to construct a successor to the Collins class has the significant 
advantage of being able to call on the considerable infrastructure and 
experience created in building those submarines.  With the responsibility for 
conducting the periodic refits of the Collins submarines, ASC has retained a 
substantial portion of its skills base, as submarine refit is in many areas no 
less an exacting task than their construction.  Although ASC does not have 
the capacity to design the new submarines, its technical capabilities have 
been sustained through responsibility for the design modifications for such 
programs as the new submarine heavyweight torpedo.  Because of the 
highly integrated positioning of equipment within the submarine pressure 
hull, the design of modifications must take account of implications for the 
disbursement of other equipments, the dynamics of hull balance and of other 
factors such as the submarine’s magnetic signature.  It was because of such 
requirements that the Commonwealth negotiated with Kockums to transfer 
the submarine design authority to ASC at the conclusion of the Collins build 
program.  This situation provides a more solid basis for proceeding with the 
new project than could have been dreamt of when Graham White and his 
team initiated work on the Collins class. 
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There has lately been something of a campaign questioning ASC’s 
performance of its long-term maintenance contract.46  From this has 
emerged an argument that the construction phase of Sea 1000 is now open 
to competition and that companies may therefore push ASC out of the 
running, provided only that they use facilities adjacent to those occupied by 
ASC in Port Adelaide.  The government contends that this will ensure that 
the cost of the new submarines will be reduced through competition. 
There is some sort of sublime nonsense here.  The production technique of 
modular construction will certainly make it possible for other companies to 
build components of the new submarines or even to assemble completed 
boats, if there is justification for an accelerated delivery schedule.  Yet a 
lesson that can be clearly drawn from the Collins project is that project 
development, management and accountability can be lodged only within one 
industrial entity, and that to defuse that authority is asking for trouble.  On 
the one hand, the government's principal card in the industrial developments 
for Sea 1000 is that it retains ownership of ASC.  As such it is unlikely that 
the Commonwealth would devalue this asset by not awarding work to the 
company.  On the other hand, should the evaluation of options indicate that 
ASC is no longer competitive, the Commonwealth can sell ASC to its 
preferred tenderer as a condition of undertaking the contract.  It is hard to 
think that agreement could not be reached on the basis of the value of ASC’s 
modern facilities and a project totaling $35 billion. 
In the scheme of a project not intended to begin deliveries until 2025, 
focusing on ASC’s supposed inefficiencies in submarine refit is a short term 
matter.  From the perspective of the long-term success of the project, there 
are other issues that deserve attention.  It is ironic that the current campaign 
against ASC concerns submarine maintenance, for this task has never been 
predictable or cheap mostly due to the variability of corrosion damage, and 
options for achieving economies are always discounted by the absolute need 
to safeguard lives.  Running submarines is an expensive business, with each 
of the Collins class costing on average almost 80 percent more to maintain 
than a comparatively simple ANZAC class frigate.47  This disparity reflects 
                                                 
46 John Kerin, ‘Surfacing Row Could Sink Sub Plans’, Australian Financial Review, 24 April 
2009; John Kerin, ‘Submarines Boss Safe—For Now’, Australian Financial Review, 30 April 
2009; John Kerin, ‘BAE Full Ahead for Sub's Tender’, Australian Financial Review, 5 May 2009; 
John Kerin, ‘Sub Builder Boss Opts to Cast Off’, Australian Financial Review, 5 May 2009.  The 
conjunction of such a number of well informed press articles usually indicates the conduct of a 
premeditated campaign. 
47 Cumulative spending on maintaining the six Collins submarines over the three years to the 
end of 2009-2010 is estimated at $966 million.  The comparable figure for the eight frigates is 
$720 million.  Department of Defence, ‘Table 3.8, Top 20 Products, by Expenditure as Forecast 
in the Portfolio Budget Statements 2007-08’, Annual Report 2007-08, Volume 2 (Canberra: 
Defence Materiel Organisation, October 2008), p.51; Department of Defence, ‘Table 2.5.3- Top 
20 sustainment products by forecast expenditure in 2008-09’, Portfolio Additional Estimates 
Statements 2008-09, Part Two, (Canberra: Defence Materiel Organisation, November 2008), p. 
167; Department of Defence, ‘Table 69: Top 20 Sustainment Products by Forecast Expenditure 
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both the complexity of the submarines and the challenges of operating in the 
hostile subsurface environment.  Nonetheless, with Sea 1000 intended to 
provide twelve submarines, cost of ownership for the new class will become 
a significant issue.  Just as the Navy sought higher rates of availability when 
it initiated the Collins project, so should lowering the cost of ownership, with 
attention to corrosion control prominent, be a criterion in developing the next 
class of submarine for the RAN. 
Defence is required to provide the government with an off-the-shelf option for 
the new submarine class.  As discussed above, however, the design 
requirements to meet the RAN's objectives are likely to be such that they can 
only be met by an extreme extrapolation of a submarine design bureau’s 
experience, as indeed was the process in designing the Collins class.  Even 
were the Collins itself to form the basis of the exercise, Sea 1000 will clearly 
be a developmental project seeking to incorporate three decades of changes 
in technology and the military arts.  It will clearly need a better process for 
managing changes in the design than was available to the Collins project. 
An adequate contingency fund with agreed procedures for its management 
will be a basic requirement.  This seems obvious but the case for this tool 
must be made explicitly, for it has been too easily assumed in the past 
(including with the Collins project) that ministers and the public would baulk 
at such an explicit indicator of risk.  The necessity of contingency funding will 
have to be clearly explained during the formative days of the project.  
Perhaps one course for emphasising this would be to allow the contingency 
fund a more active part in the management of the project, rather than holding 
it in reserve until the test and evaluation stage is reached.  One role that the 
contingency fund could play is to finance research and development of high 
risk changes that will inevitably arise as the design enters production, 
especially as it cannot be assumed that responsibility for implementing 
changes will always fall to contracted commercial parties. 
Changes that were not researched at the time were made at various stages 
during the development of the Collins design.  For instance, the design of the 
generator machinery spaces was changed during the detailed design phase 
and new isolating blocks (intended to stop the transmission of vibration 
through the hull structure and into the water as noise) were developed.  
Changes were unavoidable throughout this stage because of reworked sub-
contractor data, refined Service objectives and more detailed awareness of 
the relationship of components.  In many cases there was conjoint 
responsibility for the development of the design modifications and, although 
the contract was able to accommodate them as ‘no cost’ options, there was 
neither money nor authority in the document to conduct basic research on 
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the technologies involved.  The isolating blocks did not work as intended and 
had to be changed after research by DSTO’s Ship Noise and Vibration 
Group identified them as one of the sources of noise that had emerged after 
HMAS Collins began its trials.48  Obviously, it would have been of greater 
assistance had this research begun at the time of redesign. 
The problem faced by the Collins project office was that some of the most 
important research capabilities did not exist when the project commenced.  
The Ship Noise and Vibration Group was itself established as a separate 
entity, in an act of foresight, by the direct intervention of the project chief, 
Admiral Oscar Hughes.  The ability of the project team to directly manage 
technical risk for Sea 1000 is much improved, given the facilities established 
during the Collins project, access to USN submarine technology and new 
establishments, such as the underwater test facility opened in November 
2008.49  Active management of the contingency fund for risk mitigation 
during the boats’ development would allow the Sea 1000 project to influence 
the development of relevant technological support, either by funding the 
development of new DSTO capabilities or commissioning R&D from 
commercial sources.  It would thereby provide a degree of proofing to this 
aspect of project management, as a protection against changes in external 
priorities that might have unforeseen implications for the management of 
Sea 1000. 
There is another issue which the contingency fund should be used to 
address.  The long timescale of major acquisition projects invariably means 
that circumstances will have changed by the time equipment is delivered and 
that the sponsoring Service will now wish to operate in ways different from 
those initially envisaged.  This is a familiar issue but managing it has always 
proved difficult.  For instance, of the $1.17 billion allocated to rectify the 
faults of the Collins design following the McIntosh/Prescott report, $300 
million was to meet the costs of changed operational requirements 
(compared to only $143 million to rectify performance faults).50  It would have 
been preferable had such alterations been made throughout the course of 
the project’s development, but such changes disrupt the flow of production 
and have been held to be a major cause of poor acquisition management.  
Measuring the value of various requests for change against the funding 
provided by the contingency fund would provide the Navy with a means of 
quantifying the impact of its expectations against the project's objectives, 
and provide a tool for prioritising the desires of the sponsoring Service. 
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Conclusion 
Project Sea 1000 will be a difficult and challenging project.  The capabilities 
built for, and the experienced gained during, the Collins submarine project 
will be of great benefit to those building the new submarine.  However, the 
demands of a new era will impose performance standards on the Sea 1000 
team as exacting as those faced in delivering the Collins class.  Because of 
this, it is important that the objectives for the new class of submarine be 
thoroughly developed and clearly enunciated and that its production be 
undertaken by companies with a record of performance but, as well, an 
aptitude in adapting new technology.  Ultimately, it will remain crucial that the 
Commonwealth retains, throughout the life of the project, clear paths to the 
technology and advice that it may need to overcome problems—for it is the 
only participant that is guaranteed to retain a compelling interest in the state 
of the project some two decades hence. 
If these circumstances can be maintained, the outcome of Sea 1000 could 
be truly significant.  Improvements in propulsion, components and 
information technology gave the Collins a performance that was a quantum 
leap beyond that of its predecessor.  Developments during the quarter-
century since the initiation of the Collins project have been no less profound 
and offer strong prospects for the development of a truly outstanding 
conventional submarine.  It is feasible that design advances and the 
networked systems capabilities of the new design will at last produce a 
conventional submarine with the tactical flexibility of a nuclear boat.  If that 
proves to be the case, the RAN will undoubtedly revise its project objectives 
and seek to use the new submarines in unforeseen ways.  That will 
inevitably cause extensive problems in the management of Sea 1000 but 
that is the way of complex defence acquisition.  Maintaining the flexibility in 
project management to deal with success is as important as the capacity to 
address problems. 
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